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Deception scholars have argued that increasing the liar’s cognitive system artificially
can produce deception cues. However, if too much load is imposed, the truth tellers’
performance can also be impaired. To address this issue, we designed a veracity task
that incorporated a secondary task to increase cognitive load gradually. Also, because
deception has been associated with activity in the inferior frontal cortex (IFC), we
examined the influence of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) of the IFC on
performance. During stimulation, participants truthfully or deceptively indicated whether
each of a number of statements shown on screen was true or not. Higher load
decreased recall but not general compliance or response times (RTs). Truthful trials
yielded higher compliance rates and faster RTs than deceptive trials except for the
highest load level. Anodal right stimulation decreased compliance in truthful trials when
participants were not overloaded. Truth telling was more vulnerable to cognitive load
and tDCS than lying.
Keywords: transcranial direct current stimulation, deception, cognitive load, inhibitory control, inferior frontal
cortex
INTRODUCTION
Deception and Cognitive Load
Lying has been traditionally considered cognitively more taxing than telling the truth. An early
deception detection review suggested that, because of the cognitive difficulty of lying (compared to
truth telling), liars might display behavioral signs of cognitive load (Zuckerman et al., 1981)1. More
recently, Gombos (2006) stressed the relevance of executive functioning to lying, arguing that the
liar must inhibit the memory of the truth to deliberately replace it with plausible alternatives. Also,
deceivers need to monitor the reactions of the audience, as well as to control their own behavior to
appear honest, with all of these activities consuming cognitive resources (Gombos, 2006; see also
Vrij et al., 2008a, 2010). Sporer and Schwandt (2006, 2007; Sporer, 2016) additionally stressed the
1Early studies comparing reaction times when lying and telling the truth (e.g., Henke and Eddy, 1909; Marston, 1920)
or examining motor responses while concealing involvement in a crime (e.g., Luria, 1932) were based on theoretical
considerations connected to emotional rather than cognitive processes.
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need to take working memory models and research on
autobiographical memory into account to understand the
cognitive difficulty of lying.
Recent theorizing on the cognitive dimensions of deception
considers additional components of executive control besides
working memory (Miyake et al., 2000; see also Miyake and
Friedman, 2012). Specifically, inhibitory control (the ability to
withdraw a predominant response) and task switching (the
ability to shift attention between tasks at minimum performance
expense) might play a role in deception. Indeed, lying requires
keeping the truth in mind while elaborating a deceptive response
(working memory), withholding the truth (inhibitory control),
and switching between truthful and deceptive responses (task
switching) (e.g., Johnson et al., 2004; Spence et al., 2004;
Langleben et al., 2005). An example of a recent model considering
these elements is Walczyk et al. (2014) Activation–Decision–
Construction–Action Theory (ADCAT), according to which the
truth is automatically activated in working memory, inhibitory
control permits holding it back, and then the lie is made up and
released (Walczyk et al., 2014).
Zuckerman et al.’s (1981) contention that the increased
cognitive effort involved in lying would naturally result in liars
displaying behavioral cues of cognitive load (such as lower
speech rate, pupil dilation, or a decrease in body movements)
has not been supported. Major meta-analyses have revealed that
behavioral indicators associated with deception are rare (DePaulo
et al., 2003; Sporer and Schwandt, 2006, 2007) and that it is
extremely hard to tell whether someone is lying by observing
behavior alone (Bond and DePaulo, 2006). In view of these
findings, Vrij et al. (2008a) reasoned that to effectively detect
deception, the detector should artificially increase the senders’
cognitive load further (i.e., by asking them to tell their story in
reverse order). Under these circumstances, liars (whose cognitive
system is already taxed because of lying) will have less cognitive
resources left than truth tellers to cope with the increased
demands. As a result, they will experience cognitive overload and
will show behavioral indicators.
Based on these notions, a number of studies have been
conducted recently in which honest and deceptive participants
have been interviewed under high or low cognitive load. Two
recent systematic reviews showed that imposing load (a) increases
behavioral differences between liars and truth tellers relative
to a control condition (Vrij et al., 2016) and (b) increases
observers’ accuracy in judging veracity from behavior [Vrij
et al., 2017; but see also Levine et al.’s (2018) critique]. The
effect of imposing cognitive load has also been examined with
more artificial laboratory paradigms measuring reaction times
(Verschuere et al., 2018).
One way to increase cognitive load is with a secondary task.
Not only can liars doing a secondary task display behavioral
cues of load; they can also show poorer performance than
truth tellers on the task (Vrij et al., 2008b). This effect was
demonstrated in a study conducted by Lancaster et al. (2013).
Truthful and deceptive participants were requested to perform a
haptic sorting task while being interviewed. The results showed
that deceivers sorted incorrectly significantly more pieces (per
minute) than truth tellers.
In most prior studies, load has been manipulated
dichotomously—it is either induced or not (see Vrij et al.,
2016, 2017). This might be problematic, as the level of imposed
load can be too high, such that even truth tellers are left with little
cognitive resources and can show the same indicators of overload
as liars (see Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014; Verschuere et al., 2018).
This problem might have serious consequences if cognitive-load
approaches to detect deception are to be used in real-world,
high-stake settings. For instance, during criminal investigations,
innocent suspects displaying signs of cognitive overload could
be misclassified as liars. An alternative approach could involve
regulating the degree of cognitive load being induced, such that
the individual’s performance could be measured across a range of
increasing load. Using such a parametric manipulation (i.e., with
a secondary task of increasing difficulty), the specific amount of
cognitive load impairing the liars’ performance on a secondary
task but still not hampering the truth tellers’ performance could
be empirically determined. Hence, the main goal of this research
was to develop a task allowing us to increase cognitive load in a
progressive manner. To the extent to which lying is specifically
sensitive to cognitive load, gradually increasing cognitive load
should make deceptive responses progressively more difficult
(relative to truth telling).
Deception, Executive Control, and
Lateral Prefrontal Cortex
A secondary goal of this study was to examine whether
neuromodulation of the inferior frontal cortex [IFC; a subregion
within the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC)] has an effect on
several deceptive responses. The rationale behind this purpose
is as follows: (a) As discussed above, lying recruits executive
control processes; in particular, working memory and inhibitory
control processes seem to play important roles in deception. (b)
As described below, the IFC has been associated with working
memory, inhibitory control, and lying. (c) Therefore, disrupting
neural activity of the IFC could be expected to affect responses
associated with deception.
The idea that deception strongly recruits (executive) control
processes is consistent with the results of neuroimaging studies
showing that activity in the LPFC, as well as in other related brain
regions (i.e., anterior cingulate cortex), underpins the ability to
lie (Gombos, 2006). Indeed, a number of LPFC subregions have
been systematically linked to executive functions (i.e., Funahashi,
2001; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Badre, 2008; Dosenbach et al.,
2008). In a meta-analysis focused on the contributions of LPFC
and executive control to deception, Christ et al. (2009; see also
Farah et al., 2014) found that most deception-related prefrontal
subregions (10 out of 13) were cortical sites typically associated
with working memory, inhibitory control, and/or task switching,
with the bilateral IFC concentrating a great deal of activity. For
the present study’s purpose, we focus on working memory and
inhibitory control constructs.
Working Memory
While verbal working memory has been shown to involve a
(predominantly left-lateralized) large-scale network (D’Esposito
et al., 1998; Chein et al., 2003), the key role of the prefrontal
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cortex is widely recognized, even though the functional role of
these regions remains controversial. Indeed, results of a number
of studies using different methodologies (i.e., brain-damaged
patients, neuroimaging, neuromodulation) support the idea that
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) importantly contributes
to working memory. Thus, for example, in a study with patients,
Barbey et al. (2013) found that lesions in the left DLPFC
impaired performance in tasks that required the manipulation
of information in working memory, whereas damages in the
right hemisphere led to deficits in reasoning tasks. Also, a recent
meta-analysis concluded that anodal transcranial direct current
stimulation (tDCS) over the left (but not the right) DLPFC
boosted the benefits of working memory training (Mancuso et al.,
2016). The left IFC has been much less studied in relation to
working memory in comparison to more dorsal frontal regions,
but findings suggest that it might play a role in subvocal rehearsal
(Baldo and Dronkers, 2006) as well as in monitoring and
scanning working memory contents (Öztekin et al., 2009).
Inhibitory Control
The involvement of the right IFC in inhibitory control is now well
established, with a number of studies supporting the idea that
it is part of a largely right-lateralized network that is involved
in motor, memory, and emotional regulation (Anderson and
Hanslmayr, 2014; Engen and Anderson, 2018; Castiglione et al.,
2019). Thus, for example, using the stop-signal paradigm, which
requires one to suppress an ongoing prepotent motor response,
studies with patients, neuroimaging, and neuromodulation have
revealed a critical role of the right IFC in motor inhibition
(for a review, see Aron et al., 2014). Enhanced activity in the
right dorso- and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex has also been
shown to correlate with reduced activity in the hippocampus,
as well as with forgetting, which may be understood as an
aftereffect of memory inhibition (for a review, see Anderson and
Hanslmayr, 2014). Supporting this interpretation, recent results
from neuromodulation studies suggest that cathodal transcranial
stimulation over the right LPFC disrupts inhibitory control (Silas
and Brandt, 2016; Valle et al., 2020).
Brain Stimulation and Deceptive Responding
While neuroimaging studies only provide correlative evidence,
non-invasive brain stimulation techniques (such as tDCS) allow
researchers to test causal hypotheses on the neural basis of
cognitive functions (Filmer et al., 2014; Bestmann et al., 2015;
Fertonani and Miniussi, 2016). Specifically, tDCS involves the
delivery of a constant weak current (usually 1–2 mA) through two
(or more) surface electrodes with at least one of them placed on
the participant’s scalp (over the region of interest). The electrical
current, which flows from the anodal electrode to the cathodal
electrode over a variable period of time (i.e., 20 min), is thought
to modulate cortical excitability in the stimulated region and
in anatomically connected regions (Romero Lauro et al., 2014).
One proposed mechanism that is not completely established is
that at a cellular level, anodal stimulation increases neuronal
excitability, whereas cathodal tDCS produces the opposite effect
(via hyperpolarization) (Liebetanz et al., 2002). Although the
specific behavioral effects of stimulating prefrontal areas are
still difficult to predict (Jacobson et al., 2012), tDCS is thought
to be a useful technique to better understand the involvement
of certain brain areas (and networks) in a specific cognitive
function (Filmer et al., 2014; Bestmann et al., 2015; Fertonani
and Miniussi, 2016). In the present study, we used tDCS of lateral
prefrontal regions (specifically the IFC) to investigate its effect on
deceptive behavior.
So far only a few studies have used tDCS to investigate
deceptive responding, with contradictory results (Priori et al.,
2008; Karim et al., 2010; Mameli et al., 2010; Fecteau et al.,
2013; Maréchal et al., 2017; Noguchi and Oizumi, 2017).
Recently, Bell and DeWall (2018) conducted a meta-analysis on
the effectiveness of tDCS to the prefrontal cortex to decrease
undesirable social behaviors, including deception. Across the four
deception studies they included, effect size was close to zero
(Cohen’s d = −0.06).
However, the conflicting results might be a consequence of
the studies varying greatly in terms of the deception topic (i.e.,
autobiographical information, general-knowledge information),
the brain region stimulated (anterior prefrontal cortex or
DLPFC) and laterality (unilateral vs. bilateral stimulation), the
stimulation dose or intensity (ranging from 1 to 2 mA), the
duration of the stimulation (from 10 to 30 min), whether the
data were collected online (i.e., while the participants were
being stimulated) or offline (i.e., shortly after the cessation of
the stimulation), and the dependent measures used in each
study [e.g., while most studies measured behavioral responses
such as reaction times, Noguchi and Oizumi (2017) measured
observers’ accuracy in judging the participants’ veracity]. This
large heterogeneity in terms of procedures and measures, coupled
with the scarcity of studies, makes it difficult to draw any
firm conclusions. It is thus necessary to conduct additional
research on the topic.
In an attempt to pursue this goal, we developed a new task
to regulate the amount of cognitive load (operationalized as the
number of words to be maintained in working memory) in order
to identify how much load is necessary to differentiate between
truth telling and lying. In addition, based on previous literature
showing that (a) the left IFC plays a crucial role in verbal working
memory (e.g., Bunge et al., 2000; Veltman et al., 2003; Owen et al.,
2005), (b) the right IFC largely underpins inhibitory control (e.g.,
Anderson and Hanslmayr, 2014; Aron et al., 2014), and (c) there
is a large overlap between deception-related and executive control
brain activity (Christ et al., 2009), we used tDCS to modulate
neural activity in the IFC to investigate its potential effect on
participants’ behavior while performing the truth/lie task. To our
knowledge, the present study is the first attempt to modulate
deceptive behavior by stimulating the IFC.
The Current Study
In this study, participants had to indicate truthfully or deceptively
whether a number of general-knowledge statements (presented
as short sentences) were true or false (for similar procedures,
see Gödert et al., 2001; Mameli et al., 2010). We included
a secondary task consisting of memorizing the last word in
each sentence. Cognitive load was manipulated by progressively
increasing the number of sentences presented in each block, and
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 May 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 776
fpsyg-11-00776 May 16, 2020 Time: 17:1 # 4
Sánchez et al. Cognitive Load, tDCS and Deception
hence the number of words to be memorized by the participants.
It is important to note that this procedure largely matches the
standard one of reading span tasks that are widely used to assess
verbal working memory capacity (i.e., Daneman and Carpenter,
1980; Turner and Engle, 1989), which is usually operationalized
as the size of the largest set at which participants reliably
recall all of the final words (working memory span). Therefore,
our experimental task essentially conformed a reading span
procedure, whereby the primary task required subjects to give
“yes” or “no” answers to questions involving simple lies or truths,
while maintaining an increasing number of words in working
memory. During the experimental session, either the left or the
right IFC was stimulated with either anodal or cathodal tDCS, so
that the experimental design included four separate stimulation
conditions (depending on hemisphere and polarity) and a sham
condition. We measured three dependent variables: recall (i.e.,
the percentage of words the participants recalled after each block;
see below), compliance (i.e., the extent to which participants were
able to follow the instructions to lie or tell the truth), and response
time (RT; i.e., the time it took for participants to reply truthfully
or deceptively).
Hypotheses
As for the cognitive load manipulation, we made the following
predictions (to be tested in the sham group):
Hypothesis 1: Increasing the participants’ cognitive load will
lead to decreases in recall.
Hypothesis 2: Deceptive responses will be less compliant than
truthful responses.
Hypothesis 3: Deceptive responses will be preceded by longer
RTs than truthful responses.
In addition to these main effects, we also predicted a cognitive
load × veracity interaction on compliance and RT. Specifically,
and as the main hypotheses of the present study, we expected
increases in cognitive load to intensify the truth/lie differences
predicted in Hypotheses 2 and 3. Thus:
Hypothesis 4: The higher the cognitive load, the larger the
difference in compliance between truthful and deceptive
responses (predicted in Hypothesis 2) will become.
Hypothesis 5: The higher the cognitive load, the larger the
difference in RT between truthful and deceptive responses
(predicted in Hypothesis 3) will become.
Regarding the impact of tDCS on deceptive responses, the
scarcity of relevant knowledge prevented us from posing specific,
clear-cut directional hypotheses. Yet, we reasoned that if the IFC
plays a role in deceptive behavior (presumably the left IFC being
more involved in working memory and the right IFC being more
involved in inhibitory control), tDCS of IFC should modulate
deceptive behavior relative to sham. However, while we refrained
from making any directional prediction, we speculated that tDCS
over the left IFC could make compliance more vulnerable to
load increases, whereas tDCS of the right IFC could change
the putative impact of cognitive load on those conditions that
presumably rely heavily on inhibitory control (i.e., deceptive
trials). Importantly, to take individual differences in working
memory into account, we examined the effects of tDCS on
deceptive behavior separately for those cognitive load levels
within each participant’s memory span (efficient condition) and
those levels surpassing the individuals’ memory span (overloaded
condition). We were agnostic about the direction of the putative
effects of polarity over our regions of interests [see Bestmann
et al. (2015) for arguments in support of this approach] because
of the demonstrated non-linearity of the induced effects (anodal
tDCS does not necessarily produce enhanced performance, nor
does cathodal tDCS always lead to impairments in performance;
see Fertonani and Miniussi, 2016). In any case, we expected to
contribute to the growing literature on cognition and deception




Data were collected from 120 college students at the University
of Jaén, Spain. The sample size (n = 24 participants in each
stimulation condition) was decided prior to conducting the
experiment on the basis of the sizes of previous studies on
tDCS and deception. Since the number of participants per
group in these studies ranged from 6 to 22 (with an average
of n = 15.50), we decided to have 24 participants per group
to approach those experiments with the largest sample size.
Participants did not meet any of the following exclusion
criteria: history of neurological or psychiatric disorder, drug
abuse, susceptibility to seizures, migraines, regular medication,
implants, or neurosurgery. However, some participants were
excluded because they did not follow the instructions, they did
not understand the task, or their values were extreme (see section
“Results”). In the end, data from 113 participants were analyzed
(90 females; age: M = 20.19 years, SD = 2.78). The number of
participants in each stimulation condition ranged between 21
and 24 (see second column in Table 1). All participants were
right-handed according to the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield,
1971), and were naïve to brain stimulation. They took part
in the experiment voluntarily and received class credit for
their participation. The study was approved and carried out in
accordance with the recommendations of the Research Ethics
Committee of the University of Jaén. All participants were given
information about the study and gave written informed consent
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials
To create the experimental task, which would require participants
to comply with instructions either to lie or not while maintaining
words in working memory, we borrowed the structure of
Daneman and Carpenter’s (1980) Reading Span Test, and
its Spanish-language adaptation (Elosúa et al., 1996). More
specifically, we first created a pool of general-knowledge
sentences to be answered “yes” or “no” from which we finally
selected the 56 experimental sentences. They all were based on the
sentences used by Mameli et al. (2010), the Prueba de Amplitud
Lectora para niños (PAL-N), which is the spanish translation
of reading span test for children (Carriedo and Rucián, 2009),
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TABLE 1 | Sample characteristics.
Age Digit Span
Stimulation
Condition N nfemales M SD Range M SD
A-F7 24 19 20.75 3.89 17–37 6.04 1.49
A-F8 22 18 20.14 2.57 17–29 6.14 1.32
C-F7 22 17 20.59 3.19 17–30 6.27 1.98
C-F8 21 17 19.38 1.56 18–25 5.62 2.06
Sham 24 19 20.04 1.97 17–24 6.04 1.40
A-F7, anode over F7–FC5 and extracephalic cathode; A-F8, anode over F8–FC6
and extracephalic cathode; C-F7, cathode over F7–FC5 and extracephalic anode;
C-F8, cathode over F8–FC6 and extracephalic anode.
Oswald et al.’s (2015) Reading Span Task, the Information
subscale of several Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS)
versions (R, III, IV), and the Cervantes Institute’s (2016) test,
which measures knowledge about the Spanish constitution and
the social and cultural reality of Spain2. Sentence length was
adjusted such that it ranged from 10 to 13 words and from 19
to 27 syllables3. Also, the last word in each sentence had either
two or three syllables and was among the most frequent 10,000
Spanish words according to the latest version of the Corpus
de referencia del español actual (Reference corpus of current
Spanish) (Real Academia Española, n.d.).
To make sure that no sentence had double meaning and that
the replies were unanimous, in a previous pilot study, we asked
10 young adults to indicate whether each statement (sentence)
was true or false, as well as to assess the difficulty to reply to each
sentence on a 1-to-5 Likert scale. The sentences were modified
until they all had a mean score of 2 on the difficulty scale and all
the pilot participants’ replies were accurate.
We also made sure that the last word in each sentence had
no connection at all with the last word in the next sentence.
To decide which sentences could not go next to each other,
we considered (a) free association norms in Spanish (Fernández
et al., 2012); (b) semantic categories; (c) graphical, structural, or
formal aspects; and (d) other cultural or social aspects.
Procedure
The full experimental procedure is displayed in Figure 1. The
participants came to the laboratory individually. After (a) signing
the informed consent form, they (b) completed the screening
questionnaire (for us to check whether they were eligible to
participate), followed by (c) the backward digit span test, which
is a standard measure of memory span. Next, the participants
(d) were given the instructions and several examples of the
truth/lie task, after which brain stimulation started and the
participants (e) performed a number of practice trials4. In
2https://examenes.cervantes.es/es/ccse/examen
3The number of words is smaller than in Elosúa et al.’s (1996) Spanish adaptation
of Daneman and Carpenter’s (1980) Reading Span Test. The reason is that, in this
experiment, the instructions to lie or tell the truth were going to increase cognitive
complexity.
4Three Level 2 blocks (i.e., blocks containing two sentences, as explained in the
text below) were shown to the participants during the task description. Next, the
participants practiced with three Level 2 and two Level 3 blocks.
all, practice took about 5 min. After that, the participants
(f) performed the experimental truth/lie task while tDCS was
delivered. Therefore, all participants started performing the
experimental task after having been stimulated for at least 5 min.
Also, they all finished the task before the stimulation period
was over, even though the precise time depended on each
participant’s speed of reading aloud and recalling the words.
After the truth/lie task, the participants (g) carried out an
irrelevant filler task to ensure 20 min of stimulation, since they
all were to be assessed in the context of a different study at
the end of the experimental session. Finally, they (h) filled in
a post-experimental questionnaire asking them whether they
experienced any adverse effect during tDCS.
The experimental truth/lie task consisted of reading each
sentence being displayed on a computer screen aloud and
indicating (truthfully or deceptively) whether the statement was
true (by pressing a key with a sticker with the word “yes”
written on it) or not (by pressing a key with the word “no”). See
Figure 2 for an example. At the same time, the participant had
to memorize the last word in each sentence. We orthogonally
manipulated truthfulness, cognitive load, and brain stimulation.
Truthfulness Manipulation
The participants had to reply truthfully to one half of the
sentences and deceptively to the other half. The instruction
to lie or tell the truth was provided by placing the letter V
(“verdad” = “truth”) or M (“mentira” = “lie”) at the beginning
of each sentence. We counter-balanced a number of variables.
First, one half of the time, telling the truth required saying
“no,” while the other half, it required saying “yes.” The same
was true for lying. Second, within each level of cognitive load
(see below), the order of lying vs. truth telling was randomized.
Third, to control for any effect of the specific kind of response
required (i.e., deceptive or honest) for each sentence, we built two
versions of the entire task counter-balancing the instructions to
lie vs. tell the truth.
Cognitive Load Manipulation
The sentences were arranged in four levels that were designed to
increase cognitive load in a progressive manner. We called them
Levels 2, 3, 4, and 5 (there was no Level 1). All participants went
from Level 2 through 5 in progression. Each level contained four
blocks, and the number of sentences within each block depended
on the level. Thus, each block in Level 2 had two sentences, each
block in Level 3 had three sentences, and so forth (Figure 3).
Therefore, at the end of a Level 2 block (two sentences), the
participants had to recall two words (the last word in each of
the two sentences presented); at the end of a Level 3 block, the
participants had to recall three words; etc5. The participants had
to say the words aloud, and their replies were audio-recorded.
Each sentence was presented in the center of the screen for 9 s,
but the time to reply depended upon the number of sentences in
the block. Thus, the participants had up to 10 s to reply in Level
2, up to 15 s in Level 3, 20 s in Level 4, and 25 s in Level 5.
5Two additional blocks were placed at the beginning of Level 2 (and after the
practice trials) to make participants familiar enough with the actual task. The data
from these two initial blocks were not included in the analyses.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the experimental procedure.
FIGURE 2 | Example of a series of events for a block from Level 2.
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation
The tDCS was delivered through a battery-driven stimulator
(neuroConn DC-STIMULATOR) with two saline-soaked surface
sponge electrodes (35 cm2). The area of interest was the IFC
bilaterally. The electrode of interest was placed, depending on
the group, either over the right IFC (between F8 and FC6)
or the left IFC (between F7 and FC5) according to the 10-10
EEG international system (Jurcak et al., 2007). To minimize
its effect on the brain, the reference electrode was always
placed extracephalically, over the contralateral shoulder (Ganis,
2014). The combination of both stimulation areas and both
electrodes with different polarity (anode and cathode) results
in four stimulation conditions: (a) anode over F8–FC6 and
extracephalic cathode (hereafter A-F8), (b) cathode over F8–
FC6 and extracephalic anode (C-F8), (c) anode over F7–FC5
and extracephalic cathode (A-F7), and (d) cathode over F7–
FC5 and extracephalic anode (C-F7). For active stimulation,
participants received a constant current of 2 mA intensity for
20 min that faded in and out with an 8 s ramp. For sham
stimulation, electrodes were placed at the same position as for
the “a” stimulation condition described above, but stimulation
lasted for only 30 s.
Post-experimental Questionnaire
Finally, the participants completed a questionnaire assessing
whether tDCS had any adverse effect on them (Brunoni et al.,
2011). None of them reported major complaints or serious
discomfort associated with stimulation.
Data Analyses
The five directional hypotheses were tested with the sham
condition data. To test Hypothesis 1, we conducted a one-
way, repeated-measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) where
cognitive load (Levels 2, 3, 4, 5) was entered as the independent
variable and the percentage of words recalled as the dependent
measure. Hypotheses 2 and 4 were tested with a cognitive load
(Levels 2, 3, 4, 5) × veracity (truthful trials vs. deceptive trials)
ANOVA on compliance, whereas Hypotheses 3 and 5 were
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FIGURE 3 | Schematic representation of the load levels.
tested with a similar ANOVA on RT. Wherever the effect of
load was statistically significant, we conducted trend analyses to
examine whether the data fitted better a linear or a quadratic
trend. Also, because the load × veracity interaction effect on
compliance approached significance (see below), we conducted
additional follow-up analyses comparing truthful vs. deceptive
trials separately for each load level and conducted two separate
ANOVAs to examine the load effect separately for truthful and
deceptive trials.
To explore whether tDCS over the IFC had an impact
on memory performance, we ran a mixed ANOVA with
stimulation condition (A-F7, A-F8, C-F7, C-F8, sham) as the
between-participants factor, load (Levels 2, 3, 4, 5) as the
repeated-measure factor, and percentage of words recalled as the
dependent variable. Again, trend analyses were conducted for the
load main effect.
Finally, the potential impact of brain stimulation on
performance during truthful and deceptive trials was examined
with two mixed ANOVAs (one on compliance and one on RT).
Stimulation condition was entered as the between-participants
factor and veracity as the repeated-measure variable. In reality,
these two ANOVAs were conducted twice: first, for those load
levels where the individual participant was able to recall the whole
set of final words in at least 50% of the blocks (efficient condition),
and second, for those load levels where the participant was not
able to do so (overloaded condition). This was done to take
individual differences in working memory into account. Also,
to increase statistical power and based on visual inspection of
the pattern of the data, in some cases, we conducted additional
ANOVAs with only some of the stimulation conditions and
compared truthful and deceptive trials within specific stimulation
conditions (see section “Results” for details).
RESULTS
We first examined the data to identify both extreme values
[i.e., those deviating more than 3.0 IQR (interquartile range)
from the box in the box plot] and atypical values (i.e., those
with a 1.5- to 3.0-IQR deviation) for each variable in each
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condition. The extreme values in either dependent variable were
excluded from analyses (Tukey, 1977). In addition, extreme
and atypical values in compliance were used to identify those
participants who probably had not understood the instructions
(and whose data were thus unreliable) to dismiss them altogether.
Specifically, we excluded from all analyses those participants with
extreme and/or atypical values in compliance in at least three
out of the four cognitive load levels6. Finally, one additional
participant made errors in 40% of the experimental sentences
(specifically, she frequently failed to read the sentences aloud
and sometimes did not reply within the established time period).
Therefore, we assumed she did not understand the instructions,
and we dismissed her data. The total number of participants in
each condition, along with some descriptive data, is displayed
in Table 1. The number of participants included in specific
analyses is shown in Tables 2, 3 (these data are available
at Open Science Framework)7,8. There were no significant
age or digit span differences across stimulation conditions
(all Fs < 1).
Hypotheses 1 through 5 were tested for the sham condition.
We first describe the analyses testing these hypotheses. After
that, we report analyses with all five stimulation conditions to
explore whether tDCS modulated the potential effects of load and
veracity on performance9. Because load and veracity were entered
as a factor in some of these analyses, we also indicate whether
their effects across all stimulation conditions are consistent with
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.
Cognitive Load and Veracity Effects
(Sham Condition)
Recall
The repeated-measure ANOVA testing of the effect of cognitive
load (Levels 2, 3, 4, 5) on memory performance (recall
percentage) revealed a reliable effect of load, F(3,69) = 150.31,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.87. Trend analyses showed both the
6Note that all sentences were very simple general-knowledge phrases to which
anybody would respond with no errors under normal circumstances (as
empirically shown in the pilot study; see section “Materials and Methods”).
Therefore, participants with extreme and/or atypical errors in compliance in three
separate load levels had either not understood the instructions or chosen not to
follow them.
7https://osf.io/2ax5s/
8The number of participants included in the analyses of the overloaded condition is
the same as in Table 1 for all conditions except for sham in measuring RT, wherein
n = 23.
9Because stimulation time varied across participants, it is possible that participants
stimulated for a longer time (a) reported stronger side effects in the post-
experimental questionnaire than their peers and (b) experienced a noticeable effect
of tDCS on the dependent measures (though this is unlikely because the measures
were taken all through the task, not only at the end of the stimulation period).
We conducted a series of analyses to examine these issues. First, we found that
scores for the most relevant side effects (headache, scalp pain, tingling, itching,
burning sensation, and sleepiness) were low and did not change as a function of
either tDCS condition or stimulation duration. Second, stimulation duration had
no significant effect on either word recall or compliance, though longer stimulation
times were associated with longer RTs. This latter effect merely reflects that slow
participants (longer RTs) finished the task later than fast participants; therefore,
they were stimulated for a longer time. In short, while tDCS duration should be
considered in future experiments, it does not seem to have influenced the current
pattern of results. All these analyses are available from the corresponding authors
on request.
quadratic, F(1,23) = 8.62, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.273, and the
linear components, F(1,23) = 470.27, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.95,
to be statistically significant, even though the latter accounted
for 98% of the variance. These effects indicate that, in line
with Hypothesis 1, as cognitive load increased, recall percentage
decreased (Table 2).
In a further attempt to ascertain whether our procedure
tapped into working memory demands, we correlated the sham
participants’ digit span scores with their recall performance in the
experimental task. To do so, we calculated an equivalent score
(sentence memory span, SMS hereinafter) for the experimental
task. More specifically, we computed the highest load level
wherein each individual participant was able to correctly recall
the whole set of final words in at least two different blocks (out
of four). Thus, for example, if a given participant recalled all the
words from two blocks for Levels 2 and 3 but not for Levels 4 and
5, his/her SMS was 3. A Pearson correlation analysis showed a
reliable association between backward digit span scores and SMS,
r = 0.56, p = 0.004.
Compliance
To test Hypotheses 2 and 4, we conducted a cognitive load (Levels
2, 3, 4, 5) × veracity (truthful vs. deceptive response) ANOVA
on compliance. The cognitive load main effect failed to reach
statistical significance, F(2.48,37.14) = 2.76, p = 0.066, η2p = 0.16
(Huynh–Feldt correction), and pairwise comparisons failed to
reveal any significant difference (all ps ≥ 0.179). Of note is that
compliance was quite high across all load levels (see Table 2). The
main effect of veracity was very large and reliable, F(1,15) = 50.04,
p < 0.001, d = 1.75, revealing that, as predicted in Hypothesis 2,
participants in the sham group were less compliant on deceptive
trials than they were on truthful trials (Table 2). Finally, the
load × veracity interaction effect was marginally significant,
with a relatively large effect size, F(3,45) = 2.41, p = 0.079,
η2p = 0.14. Because of its relevance for the present research,
we first followed up the interaction by looking at the effect
of veracity in each individual load level. Simple effect analyses
showed reliable differences between truthful and deceptive trials
in Levels 2 (p < 0.001, d = 1.47), 3 (p = 0.003, d = 1.15), and 4
(p = 0.033, d = 0.70), but not 5 (p = 0.206, d = 0.47). Hence, the
magnitude of the veracity effect decreased progressively as load
increased, becoming statistically non-significant in the condition
with the highest memory load.
Because the lack of a difference in Level 5 seemed to be largely
due to performance deflation on truthful trials (see Table 2), we
examined the effect of load separately for deceptive and truthful
trials. Whereas load level did not affect compliance on deceptive
trials, F(3,45) = 2.09, p = 0.114, η2p = 0.12, for truthful trials,
the effect was statistically significant, F(3,45) = 6.05, p = 0.001,
η2p = 0.29. Specifically, on truthful trials, the participants
complied 100% of the time under load Levels 2 and 3; however,
their mean compliance across Levels 4 and 5 was M = 94.03
(SD = 6.75). This figure was statistically lower than compliance
across Levels 2 and 3, F(1,15) = 12.50, p = 0.003, d = 0.69. This
effect indicates that the increase in cognitive load slightly (but
significantly) hindered performance on truthful but not deceptive
trials, which clearly goes against our Hypothesis 4.
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TABLE 2 | Means (Standard Deviations) for recall, compliance, and response time under different levels of cognitive load in the sham condition.
Compliance (N = 16) Response Time (N = 23)
Cognitive Recall Across all Truthful Deceptive Across all Truthful Deceptive
Load (N = 24) trials trials trials trials trials trials
Level 2 86.90 (10.74) 90.63 (8.54) 100.00 (0.00) 81.25 (17.08) 1.06 (0.45) 1.02 (0.46) 1.10 (0.54)
Level 3 68.75 (14.38) 95.25 (5.27) 100.00 (0.00) 90.50 (10.55) 1.23 (0.57) 1.06 (0.55) 1.39 (0.63)
Level 4 51.04 (15.27) 87.34 (12.51) 93.19 (9.97) 81.50 (20.29) 1.14 (0.51) 1.06 (0.59) 1.23 (0.52)
Level 5 42.17 (10.82) 93.03 (5.50) 94.88 (6.65) 91.19 (8.86) 1.10 (0.43) 1.02 (0.43) 1.18 (0.48)
Overall 62.22 (11.00) 91.56 (4.68) 97.02 (3.38) 86.11 (7.17) 1.13 (0.46) 1.04 (0.45) 1.22 (0.49)
Recall and compliance were measured as percentages, and response time in seconds. For compliance, sample size is small because those participants who committed
many errors were excluded from analyses (see beginning of section “Results” in text). Because of a technical problem, response time could not be measured for
one participant.
TABLE 3 | Means (Standard Deviations) for compliance and response time as a function of stimulation conditions in the efficient condition.
Compliance Response Time
Stimulation Across all Truthful Deceptive Across all Truthful Deceptive
Condition n trials trials trials n trials trials trials
A-F7 17 91.99 (13.08) 100.00 (0.00) 83.97 (26.15) 22 1.11 (0.47) 0.97 (0.43) 1.24 (0.58)
A-F8 21 90.68 (11.36) 90.48 (18.17) 90.87 (12.82) 21 1.05 (0.37) 1.02 (0.39) 1.09 (0.41)
C-F7 16 94.71 (8.93) 100.00 (0.00) 89.41 (17.86) 20 1.19 (0.36) 1.04 (0.39) 1.34 (0.46)
C-F8 20 95.21 (7.77) 100.00 (0.00) 90.42 (15.54) 20 1.04 (0.42) 0.93 (0.37) 1.15 (0.56)
Sham 20 94.69 (8.29) 100.00 (0.00) 89.38 (16.58) 22 1.12 (0.47) 1.04 (0.47) 1.20 (0.54)
Overall 94 93.42 (9.99) 97.87 (9.32) 88.96 (17.77) 105 1.10 (0.42) 1.00 (0.40) 1.20 (0.51)
Compliance was measured as a percentage, and response time in seconds. A-F7, anode over F7–FC5 (left inferior frontal cortex) and extracephalic cathode; A-F8, anode
over F8–FC6 (right inferior frontal cortex) and extracephalic cathode; C-F7, cathode over F7–FC5 (left inferior frontal cortex) and extracephalic anode; C-F8, cathode over
F8–FC6 (right inferior frontal cortex) and extracephalic anode.
Response Time
To test Hypotheses 3 and 5, we conducted a cognitive
load × veracity ANOVA on RT. The cognitive load main effect
was only marginally significant, F(3,66) = 2.52, p = 0.065,
η2p = 0.10, but pairwise comparisons failed to reveal any
significant difference (all ps ≥ 0.115). The main effect of veracity
was statistically significant, F(1,22) = 19.06, p < 0.001, d = 0.39,
revealing that, as predicted in Hypothesis 3, participants in
the sham group responded faster to truthful than to deceptive
trials (Table 2). The interaction effect did not reach statistical
significance, F(2.20,48.49) = 1.76, p = 0.180, η2p = 0.07 (Huynh–
Feldt correction). Thus, Hypothesis 5 was not supported:
Response latencies for deceptive trials (relative to truthful trials)
were similarly longer regardless of load level.
Effects of tDCS Over IFC on Memory
Performance
While our main interest was to examine the effect of tDCS on
deceptive behavior, we first looked at its potential modulation
of memory performance. Thus, we first analyzed whether SMS
varied as a function of the tDCS condition. A one-way ANOVA
with stimulation as the factor (A-F7, A-F8, C-F7, C-F8, sham)
revealed that this was not the case, F(4,108) < 1, p = 0.92,
η2p < 0.01. We also conducted a mixed ANOVA with stimulation
(between-group) and load (within-participants) as the factors
on the percentages of words recalled. In line with Hypothesis 1
and the above results for the sham condition only, the analysis
showed a reliable main effect of load, F(3,312) = 475.66, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.82, and trend analyses showed that although both the
linear and the quadratic trend were reliable, the data fitted much
better a linear trend, F(1,104) = 1163.73, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.92,
than a quadratic one, F(1,104) = 57.72, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.36.
However, neither the stimulation effect, F(4,104) < 1, p = 0.905,
η2p = 0.01, nor the interaction effect, F(12,312) < 1, p = 0.866,
η2p = 0.02, reached statistical significance. These outcomes show
that tDCS had no influence on memory performance.
Effects of tDCS Over IFC on Compliance
and RTs During Truthful and Deceptive
Trials
The possible effect of tDCS on deceptive behavior was
examined considering individual differences in working memory.
Specifically, we clustered performance according to the SMS of
each participant, so that load was reduced from four to two
levels as a function of whether it concerned load conditions
under/equal to or over the participant’s SMS (efficient condition
or overloaded condition, respectively). Thus, for example, for a
given participant with SMS = 3, compliance would be analyzed
by averaging performance in load Levels 2 and 3 to comprise
the efficient condition, and performance in load Levels 4 and 5
to embrace the overloaded condition. Below we report separate
analyses for efficient and overloaded conditions.
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Efficient Condition
We conducted a mixed ANOVA on compliance with stimulation
condition (A-F7, A-F8, C-F7, C-F8, sham) as the between-
participants factor and veracity (truthful trials vs. deceptive trials)
as the repeated-measures variable. Consistent with Hypothesis
2 and the above results for the sham condition only, the main
effect of veracity was statistically significant, F(1,89) = 20.39,
p < 0.001, d = 0.63, so that participants were more compliant
when responding to truthful than deceptive trials (Table 3). But
the omnibus analysis failed to show any reliable effect of either
stimulation condition, F(4,89) < 1, p = 0.539 η2p = 0.03, or
the interaction, F(4,89) = 1.78, p = 0.141, η2p = 0.07. However,
because visual exploration of the data suggested that there were
changes in the two conditions involving anodal stimulation, to
increase statistical power, we conducted the ANOVA entering
only the sham, the anodal left IFC (A-F7), and the anodal right
IFC (A-F8) stimulation conditions. This analysis showed that
the stimulation condition × veracity interaction approached
statistical significance, F(2,55) = 2.91, p = 0.06, η2p = 0.10, and
we performed follow-up analyses that confirmed a reliable effect
of veracity for the sham (p = 0.032, d = 0.97) and the left IFC
conditions (p = 0.003, d = 0.93), but not for the right IFC
condition (p = 0.933, d = −0.03). In this latter group, compliance
during truthful trials dropped off to the level of deceptive trials
(see Table 3). Hence, anodal tDCS over the right IFC hindered
performance only when participants were to tell the truth.
The stimulation condition × veracity ANOVA on RT showed
the main effect of veracity to be reliable, F(1,100) = 28.58,
p < 0.001, d = 0.43. As predicted in Hypothesis 3, deceptive
responses required longer times than truthful responses
(see Table 3). However, neither the stimulation condition,
F(4,100) < 1, p = 0.813, η2p = 0.02, nor the interaction,
F(4,100) = 1.08, p = 0.372, η2p = 0.04, was statistically significant.
To increase statistical power, and based on visual inspection
of the data pattern, we conducted a new analysis including
only the Sham, the cathodal left IFC, and the anodal right IFC
conditions in the factorial ANOVA. Again, neither stimulation
condition, F(2,60) < 1, p = 0.561, η2p = 0.02, nor the interaction,
F(2,60) = 1.83, p = 0.170, η2p = 0.06, reached statistical
significance, though the veracity effect remained reliable,
F(1,60) = 14.15, p < 0.001, d = 0.39.
Overloaded Condition
The mixed 5 (stimulation condition) × 2 (veracity) ANOVA on
compliance showed that the only reliable source of variability was
veracity, F(1,108) = 34.45, p < 0.001, d = 0.69 [for stimulation
condition: F(4,108) = 1.32, p = 0.268, η2p = 0.05; for the
interaction: F(4,108) < 1, p = 0.868, η2p = 0.01]. Again, the
participants were significantly more compliant when responding
truthfully (M = 92.88, SD = 7.41) than deceptively (M = 86.67,
SD = 10.15). A similar ANOVA on response latencies also
showed that the only reliable effect was veracity, F(1,107) = 48.87,
p < 0.001, d = 0.34 [for stimulation condition: F(4,107) < 1,
p = 0.996, η2p = 0.00; for the interaction: F(4,107) = 1.58, p = 0.186
η2p = 0.06]. Deceptive responses required longer times (M = 1.24,
SD = 0.43) than truthful responses (M = 1.09, SD = 0.44).
DISCUSSION
Lying has been traditionally considered cognitively more taxing
than truth telling, and it is assumed that working memory and
inhibitory control play a role in deceptive behavior. Because of
the cognitive cost of lying, if cognitive load is artificially increased
further (e.g., with a secondary task), the liar’s cognitive system
might become overloaded. This, in turn, can produce behavioral
indicators that might suggest deception (Vrij et al., 2016, 2017).
However, in some circumstances, the level of imposed load can be
so high that it can impair not only the liars’ performance but also
that of the truth tellers. By progressively regulating the level of
induced load, the amount of it hampering the liars’ performance
but still not interfering with the truth tellers’ performance could
be determined. Therefore, the main goal of this research was
to develop a veracity task with an embedded concurrent task
to increase cognitive load in a progressive manner, so that we
can examine its influence on truthful and deceptive responding.
As complementary goals, and because the left prefrontal cortex
plays a role in verbal working memory (e.g., Bunge et al., 2000;
Owen et al., 2005), and its right counterpart is more clearly
involved in inhibitory control (e.g., Anderson and Hanslmayr,
2014; Aron et al., 2014), we wanted to explore whether online
stimulation over either the left or the right IFC had an impact
on deceptive behavior.
Cognitive Load and Veracity
The influence of cognitive load on recall, compliance, and RT
during deceptive and truthful responding was examined with
the sham condition. The analyses revealed that our experimental
task was effective in parametrically increasing load: First, the
correlation between the participants’ digit span scores and
their recall performance in the task (operationalized as SMS)
was substantial and reliable. Second, and in line with this
finding, we observed that the higher the load level, the lower
the participants’ recall (measured as the percentage of words
recalled). Importantly, this effect was reliable not only for
the sham condition but also across all stimulation conditions.
Altogether, these findings indicate that our task imposed actual
working memory demands that entitle us to look into the
effects of cognitive load on compliance and RT in deceptive and
truthful trials.
Our experimental task also worked fairly well to show veracity
effects. Specifically, deceptive responding consistently produced
both less compliance and longer RTs compared to truthful
responding. These effects were very robust and constitute further
evidence that lying (even of the simple kind used in our
paradigm) recruits more cognitive resources than truth telling.
The effect on latencies is consistent with the main conclusions
of two recent meta-analyses showing that RT (measured using
precise, computer-based paradigms) was longer when responding
deceptively than when responding truthfully (Suchotzki et al.,
2017; Verschuere et al., 2018).
Thorough examination of performance in the sham condition
also revealed that, contrary to our expectation, higher load levels
did not produce progressively larger differences between liars
and truth tellers. On the contrary, fine-tuned analyses revealed
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that increasing cognitive load decreased compliance on truthful
but not on deceptive trials, such that in Level 5, the difference
between truths and lies was no longer significant and had the
smallest effect size. This finding underscores the risk mentioned
in the introduction that particularly high levels of induced load
can be detrimental for truth tellers (e.g., Blandón-Gitlin et al.,
2014). Empirical evidence supporting this peril is accumulating:
A meta-analysis of 21 individual studies showed that imposing
cognitive load does not increase RT differences between truthful
and deceptive responses; instead, a small but significant effect was
found showing that the induced load decreased the difference
by increasing the RT in responding truthfully (Verschuere et al.,
2018). This effect might have important consequences if long
reaction times (or other cognitive load indicators) are used in
applied settings to identify liars, as it can increase the risk of
false positives.
In the current experiment, truthful and deceptive trials
differed in compliance and RT even in low-cognitive-load
conditions. This may suggest that the secondary task per se
induced sufficient load and that increasing load further (up to
Level 5) did not increase the truth–lie differences by decreasing
the liars’ performance further. However, as we had no Level 0
condition (a no-load condition wherein the participants would
not need to recall any word after each block), we cannot know
for sure whether this is the case or, rather, differences between
truthful and deceptive trials would have emerged also with no
load inducement. Future research should examine this issue.
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation
Only a few studies have examined the impact of tDCS
of prefrontal regions on deceptive responding, yielding
contradictory results and negligible effects (see Bell and DeWall,
2018). Importantly, studies that have used non-invasive brain
stimulation techniques others than tDCS also failed to modulate
deception. For example, Verschuere et al. (2012) employed
continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS) to disrupt neural
activity in the right inferior frontal sulcus. Their participants were
to respond truthfully and deceptively to a set of autobiographical
questions. Contrary to their predictions, cTBS had no effect on
either RTs or error rates compared to the sham condition.
The heterogeneity of findings across studies can be a
consequence of the diversity of procedures and measures used
in extant research. This diversity, coupled with the scarcity of
studies, makes it hard to draw any firm conclusion and suggests
that more research is needed. Hence, an additional goal of
the present study was to examine whether tDCS of the left
or right IFC (a prefrontal region that has been systematically
linked to executive control and deception) had an influence
on compliance and RT during deceptive and truthful trials.
Our general prediction was that if the IFC plays a role in
deceptive behavior (i.e., underpinning working memory and
inhibitory control processes), changing neural activity within
the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex by means of tDCS should
modulate performance in deceptive trials as compared to sham.
Importantly, we assessed such a possible neuromodulation effect
separately for those load levels wherein participants were not
cognitively burdened (efficient condition) and for the remaining
load levels (overloaded condition).
While there was no effect of tDCS on compliance or RT in the
overloaded condition, a tDCS-related compliance modulation
emerged in the efficient condition. Specifically, anodal tDCS of
the right IFC rendered truth and lie responses more similar
by virtue of disrupting compliance only in truthful trials (all
conditions with 100% but A-F8 with 90%). Thus, stimulating
the right IFC did not modulate deceptively responding (nor
recalling) but affected truthfully responding. This is a striking
finding since both deception and activity in the right IFC have
been associated with inhibitory control (e.g., Christ et al., 2009;
Aron et al., 2014; Walczyk et al., 2014). Hence, in principle,
one would expect neuromodulation of this region to impact
on the ability to lie rather than tell the truth, which leads us
to take the present conspicuous finding with caution and call
for further replication with high-powered studies. In addition,
some of our analyses were post hoc and exploratory; therefore,
the outcomes need to be interpreted cautiously. Finally, it is
important to note that transcranial stimulation in the present
study was mostly delivered while participants were performing
the experimental task (online tDCS). It would be interesting to
replicate the study with offline tDCS (before the task) to see
whether it modulates deceptive behavior and/or interacts with
cognitive load when lying.
While the neurocognitive mechanism underlying the observed
impairment in responding honestly in the present study is not
obvious to us, it does not seem to be related to the active
maintenance of task-relevant information in working memory,
since none of the stimulation conditions impacted on SMS or
the percentage of words recalled. It is important to highlight
here, however, that the right IFC is thought to be involved in
a number of cognitive functions that include, in addition to
deception and inhibitory control, action coordination of multi-
component behavior (i.e., Dippel and Beste, 2015; for a functional
segregation of the right IFC, see Hartwigsen et al., 2019). Along
these lines, a recent study that applied TBS to the right IFC found
this region to be causally involved in implementing strategies
to organize actions that were to be deployed in cascade (Dippel
and Beste, 2015). Hence, and because the experimental task used
in the present experiment was necessarily complex in terms
of the number and nature of components (i.e., reading and
comprehending each sentence, interpreting the truth/lie cue in
every trial, maintaining a number of words in working memory,
responding accordingly to truthful and deceptive trials, saying
the final words aloud. . .), we speculate that anodal tDCS could
have slightly impacted on how the sequence of actions was
coordinated, specifically in relation to responding to the truth/lie
task. Since it was during truthful trials when participants were
more compliant (virtually 100% in our task), performance on
these trials had the largest room for being hampered by tDCS.
However, while we again acknowledge that any interpretation
of our truth-telling-related finding requires caution and further
replication, our null result concerning deceptive trials is totally
consistent with those from related prior research that used
brain stimulation techniques and failed to observe reliable effects
(Verschuere et al., 2012; Bell and DeWall, 2018).
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Limitations
Two limitations of the present study deserve to be mentioned.
First, the truth/lie task used here may have hindered the
modulation of inhibition-related neural activity in the IFC.
Indeed, the effect of tDCS over a specific brain region (most likely
as a node within a distributed network) is thought to critically
depend on the neural engagement of the stimulated region during
the cognitive task (Silvanto et al., 2008; Bikson et al., 2013;
Miniussi et al., 2013; Rodrigues de Almeida et al., 2019). Hence,
while our experimental task worked fairly well by inducing
cognitive load and veracity effects, given the number of cognitive
operations it involved, its demands for inhibitory control may
not have been sufficient for tDCS to change inhibition-related
neural activity. Future studies on the role of inhibitory control
in lying should consider the use of veracity tasks with a higher
load of (and greater specificity for) such a process. Second, the
unequal number of males and females in our sample limits our
conclusions concerning tDCS, since the small number of males
precluded the inclusion of gender as a variable in the statistical
analyses. A recent study has reported gender-related individual
differences in current distribution (Russell et al., 2014), and we
recognize that such differences could have blurred the effects of
tDCS in our experiment.
Conclusion
We designed a new experimental task to increase cognitive
load gradually while participants are to either tell the truth or
lie regarding general-knowledge facts. The task worked fairly
well, and we observed the basic expected effects of veracity and
working memory load. We did not find, however, any evidence
that cognitive load may impact on lying, since load increases did
not enhance the difference between truthful and deceptive trials.
Instead, very high load levels reduced compliance in truthful
trials, making the truth–lie discrimination based on compliance
more difficult. Future refinements of the experimental task can
be made to increase the sensitivity of the dependent measures to
load manipulation and to make the task usable in other (i.e., more
natural) contexts.
On the other hand, tDCS of the IFC (either left or right) had no
impact on working memory performance and had only relative
influence on compliance and RT during truthful and deceptive
trials. Only the anodal stimulation of the right IFC decreased
compliance in truthful trials, thus hampering the discrimination
between truths and lies. Because non-invasive brain stimulation
research is in its infancy, additional studies should be conducted
to examine its effect on deceptive responding. However, it is
important to highlight that our findings join those from previous
studies to show small or null effects of non-invasive brain
stimulation techniques on deceptive behavior.
Finally, it is remarkable that both cognitive load and tDCS
decreased compliance but only in the truthful trials. In fact,
the ability to respond deceptively was not modulated at all by
any condition. As previously mentioned, high mental load (and
maybe also disruption by tDCS of normal neural activity in the
right IFC) would seem to be largely damaging to truth telling
(Verschuere et al., 2018; see also the arguments by Blandón-
Gitlin et al., 2014). Further research is clearly necessary to
replicate, extend, and gain understanding of this putative higher
vulnerability of truthful conditions to performance impairment.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The datasets generated for this study are available at https://osf.
io/2ax5s/.
ETHICS STATEMENT
The studies involving human participants were reviewed and
approved by the Comité de bioética de la Universidad de Jaén.
The participants provided their written informed consent to
participate in this study.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
NS, CG-A, and JM developed the research questions and wrote
the manuscript. NS and CG-A designed the study, recruited the
participants, and performed the analyses. NS collected the data.
FUNDING
The current study was completed thanks to financial support
by the Sistema Nacional de Garantia Juvenil to NS at the
University of Jaén, by a grant from the Ministerio de Economía
y Competitividad from Spain to CG-A (PSI2015-65502-C2-2-
P), and by an award from the Sociedad Española de Psicología
Experimental (SEPEX; Beca a la Difusión de Trabajos de
Investigación, Convocatoria 2017-2018).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors are very grateful to Miriam Bermúdez and
Juanjo Imbernón, who participated as research assistants in
this experiment.
REFERENCES
Anderson, M. C., and Hanslmayr, S. (2014). Neural mechanisms of motivated
forgetting. Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 279–292. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.03.002
Aron, A. R., Robbins, T. W., and Poldrack, R. A. (2014). Inhibition and the right
inferior frontal cortex: one decade on. Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 177–185. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2013.12.003
Badre, D. (2008). Cognitive control, hierarchy, and the rostro–caudal organization
of the frontal lobes. Trends Cogn. Sci. 12, 193–200. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.
004
Baldo, J. V., and Dronkers, N. F. (2006). The role of inferior
parietal and inferior frontal cortex in working memory.
Neuropsychology 20, 529–538. doi: 10.1037/0894-4105.20.
5.529
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 May 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 776
fpsyg-11-00776 May 16, 2020 Time: 17:1 # 13
Sánchez et al. Cognitive Load, tDCS and Deception
Barbey, A. K., Koenigs, M., and Grafman, J. (2013). Dorsolateral prefrontal
contributions to human working memory. Cortex 49, 1195–1205. doi: 10.1016/
j.cortex.2012.05.022
Bell, S. B., and DeWall, N. (2018). Does transcranial direct current stimulation to
the prefrontal cortex affect social behavior? A meta-analysis. Soc. Cogn. Affect.
Neurosci. 13, 899–906. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsy069
Bestmann, S., de Berker, A. O., and Bonaiuto, J. (2015). Understanding the
behavioural consequences of non-invasive brain stimulation. Trends Cogn. Sci.
19, 13–20. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.10.003
Bikson, M., Name, A., and Rahman, A. (2013). Origins of specificity during
tDCS: anatomical, activity-selective, and input-bias mechanisms. Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 7:688. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00688
Blandón-Gitlin, I., Fenn, E., Masip, J., and Yoo, A. (2014). Cognitive-load
approaches to detect deception: searching for cognitive mechanisms. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 18, 441–444. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.05.004
Bond, C. F., and DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. Rev. 10, 214–234. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2
Brunoni, A. R., Amadera, J., Berbel, B., Volz, M. S., Rizzerio, B. G., and
Fregni, F. (2011). A systematic review on reporting and assessment of
adverse effects associated with transcranial direct current stimulation. Intern.
J. Neuropsychopharmacol. 14, 1133–1145. doi: 10.1017/S1461145710001690
Bunge, S. A., Klinberg, T., Jacobsen, R. B., and Gabrieli, J. D. (2000). A resource
model of the neural basis of executive working memory. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 97, 3573–3578. doi: 10.1073/pnas.97.7.3573
Carriedo, N., and Rucián, M. (2009). Adaptación para niños de la prueba de
amplitud lectora de Daneman y Carpenter (PAL-N) [Adaptation of Daneman
and Carpenter’s reading span test (PAL-N) for children]. Infancia y Aprendizaje
32, 449–465. doi: 10.1174/021037009788964079
Castiglione, A., Wagner, J., Anderson, M., and Aron, A. R. (2019). Preventing a
thought from coming to mind elicits increased right frontal beta just as stopping
action does. Cereb. Cortex 29, 2160–2172. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhz017
Cervantes Institute (2016). CCSE: Manual Para La Preparación De La Prueba De
Conocimientos Constitucionales Y Socioculturales De España [Manual for the
Preparation for the Constitutional and Sociocultural Knowledge Of Spain Test].
Madrid: Instituto Cervantes.
Chein, J. M., Ravizza, S. M., and Fiez, J. A. (2003). Using neuroimaging to evaluate
models of working memory and their implications for language processing.
J. Neurolinguist. 16, 315–339. doi: 10.1016/S0911-6044(03)00021-6
Christ, S. E., Van Essen, D. C., Watson, J. M., Brubaker, L. E., and McDermott,
K. B. (2009). The contributions of prefrontal cortex and executive control to
deception: evidence from activation likelihood estimate meta-analyses. Cereb.
Cortex 19, 1557–1566. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhn189
Daneman, M., and Carpenter, P. A. (1980). Individual differences in working
memory and reading. J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 19, 450–466.
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K., and
Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychol. Bull. 129, 74–118. doi: 10.1037/
0033-2909.129.1.74
D’Esposito, M., Aguirre, G. K., Zarahn, E., Ballard, D., Shin, R. K., and Lease,
J. (1998). Functional MRI studies of spatial and nonspatial working memory.
Cogn. Brain Res. 7, 1–13. doi: 10.1016/s0926-6410(98)00004-4
Dippel, G., and Beste, C. (2015). A causal role of the right inferior frontal cortex in
implementing strategies for multi-component behavior. Nat. Commun. 6:6587.
doi: 10.1038/ncomms7587
Dosenbach, N. U. F., Fair, D. A., Cohen, A. L., Schlaggar, B. L., and Petersen, S. E.
(2008). A dual-networks architecture of top-down control. Trends Cogn. Sci. 12,
99–105. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.01.001
Elosúa, M. R., Gutiérrez, F., García Madruga, J. A., Luque, J. L., and Gárate,
M. (1996). Adaptación española del “Reading Span Test” de Daneman y
Carpenter [Spanish adaptation of Daneman and Carpenter’s “Reading Span
Test”]. Psicothema 8, 383–395.
Engen, H. G., and Anderson, M. C. (2018). Memory control: a fundamental
mechanism of emotion regulation. Trends Cogn. Sci. 22, 982–995. doi: 10.1016/
j.tics.2018.07.015
Farah, M., Hutchinson, J. B., Phelps, E. A., and Wagner, A. D. (2014). Functional
MRI-based lie detection: scientific and societal challenges. Nat. Rev. Neurosci.
15, 123–131. doi: 10.1038/nrn3702
Fecteau, S., Boggio, P. S., Fregni, F., and Pascual-Leone, A. (2013). Modulation
of untruthful responses with non-invasive brain stimulation. Front. Psychiatry
3:97. doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2012.00097
Fernández, A., Díez, E., and Alonso, M. A. (2012). Normas De Asociación Libre En
Castellano [Free Association Norms In Spanish]. Available online at: http://inico.
usal.es/usuarios/gimc/normas/buscar_nal.asp (accessed October 1, 2017).
Fertonani, A., and Miniussi, C. (2016). Transcranial electrical stimulation: what
we know and do not know about mechanisms. Neuroscientist 23, 109–123.
doi: 10.1177/1073858416631966
Filmer, H. L., Dux, P. E., and Mattingley, J. B. (2014). Application of transcranial
direct current stimulation for understanding brain function. Trends Neurosci.
37, 742–753. doi: 10.1016/j.tins.2014.08.003
Funahashi, S. (2001). Neuronal mechanisms of executive control by the prefrontal
cortex. Neurosci. Res. 39, 147–165. doi: 10.1016/S0168-0102(00)00224-8
Ganis, G. (2014). “Investigating deception and deception detection with brain
stimulation methods,” in Detecting Deception: Current Challenges And Cognitive
Approaches, eds P. A. Granhag, A. Vrij, and B. Verschuere (Chichester: Wiley),
253–268.
Gödert, H. W., Rill, H. G., and Vossel, G. (2001). Psychophysiological
differentiation of deception: the effects of electrodermal lability and mode of
responding on skin conductance and heart rate. Int. J. Psychophysiol. 40, 61–75.
doi: 10.1016/S0167-8760(00)00149-5
Gombos, V. A. (2006). The cognition of deception: the role of executive processing
in producing lies. Genet. Soc. Gen. Psychol. Monogr. 132, 197–214.
Hartwigsen, G., Neef, N. E., Camilleri, J. A., Margulies, D. S., and Eickhoff, S. B.
(2019). Functional segregation of the right inferior frontal gyrus: evidence from
coactivation-based parcellation. Cereb. Cortex 29, 1532–1546. doi: 10.1093/
cercor/bhy049
Henke, F. G., and Eddy, M. W. (1909). Mental diagnosis by the association reaction
method. Psychol. Rev. 16, 399–409. doi: 10.1037/h0070202
Jacobson, L., Koslowsky, M., and Lavidor, M. (2012). tDCS polarity effects in motor
and cognitive domains: a meta-analytical review. Exp. Brain Res. 216, 1–10.
doi: 10.1007/s00221-011-2891-9
Johnson, R. J., Barnhardt, J., and Zhu, J. (2004). The contribution of executive
processes to deceptive responding. Neuropsychologia 42, 878–901. doi: 10.1016/
j.neuropsychologia.2003.12.005
Jurcak, V., Tsuzuki, D., and Dan, I. (2007). 10/20, 10/10, and 10/5 systems revisited:
their validity as relative head-surface-based positioning systems. Neuroimage
34, 1600–1611. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.09.024
Karim, A. A., Schneider, M., Lotze, M., Veit, R., Sauseng, P., Braun, C., et al. (2010).
The truth about lying: inhibition of the anterior prefrontal cortex improves
deceptive behavior. Cereb. Cortex 20, 205–213. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhp090
Lancaster, G. L., Vrij, A., Hope, L., and Waller, B. (2013). Sorting the liars from
the truth tellers: The benefits of asking unanticipated questions on lie detection.
Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 27, 107–114. doi: 10.1002/acp.2879
Langleben, D. D., Loughead, J., Bilker, W. B., Ruparel, K., Childress, A., Busch,
S. I., et al. (2005). Telling the truth from lie in individual subjects with fast
event-related fMRI. Hum. Brain Mapp. 26, 262–272. doi: 10.1002/hbm.20191
Levine, T. R., Blair, J. P., and Carpenter, C. J. (2018). A critical look at meta-analytic
evidence for the cognitive approach to lie detection: a re-examination of Vrij.
Fisher, and Blank (2017). Legal Criminol. Psychol. 23, 7–19. doi: 10.1111/lcrp.
12115
Liebetanz, D., Nitsche, M. A., Tergau, F., and Paulus, W. (2002). Pharmacological
approach to the mechanisms of transcranial DC-stimulation-induced after-
effects of human motor cortex excitability. Brain 125, 2238–2247. doi: 10.1093/
brain/awf238
Luria, A. (1932). The Nature Of Human Conflicts Or Emotion, Conflict And Will.
New York, NY: Liveright.
Mameli, F., Mrakic-Sposta, S., Vergari, M., Fumagalli, M., Macis, M., Ferrucci, R.,
et al. (2010). Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex specifically processes general–but
not personal–knowledge deception: multiple brain networks for lying. Behav.
Brain Res. 211, 164–168. doi: 10.1016/j.bbr.2010.03.024
Mancuso, L. E., Ilieva, I. P., Hamilton, R. H., and Farah, M. J. (2016). Does
transcranial direct current stimulation improve healthy working memory?: a
meta-analytic review. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 28, 1063–1089. doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_
00956
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 May 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 776
fpsyg-11-00776 May 16, 2020 Time: 17:1 # 14
Sánchez et al. Cognitive Load, tDCS and Deception
Maréchal, M. A., Cohn, A., Ugazio, G., and Ruff, C. C. (2017). Increasing honesty
in humans with noninvasive brain stimulation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 114,
4360–4364. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1614912114
Marston, W. M. (1920). Reaction-time symptoms of deception. J. Exp. Psychol. 3,
72–87. doi: 10.1037/h0067963
Miller, E. K., and Cohen, J. D. (2001). An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex
function. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 24, 167–202. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.24.1.
167
Miniussi, C., Harris, J. A., and Ruzzoli, M. (2013). Modelling non-invasive brain
stimulation in cognitive neuroscience. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 37, 1702–1712.
doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.06.014
Miyake, A., and Friedman, N. P. (2012). The nature and organization of individual
differences in executive functions: four general conclusions. Curr. Direct.
Psychol. Sci. 21, 8–14. doi: 10.1177/0963721411429458
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, H., Howerter, A., and
Wager, T. D. (2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their
contributions to complex “Frontal Lobe” tasks: a latent variable analysis. Cognit.
Psychol. 41, 49–100. doi: 10.1006/cogp.1999.0734
Noguchi, Y., and Oizumi, R. (2017). Electric stimulation of the right temporo-
parietal junction induces a task-specific effect in deceptive behaviors. Neurosci.
Res. 128, 33–39. doi: 10.1016/j.neures.2017.07.004
Oldfield, R. C. (1971). The assessment and analysis of handedness: the Edinburgh
inventory. Neuropsychologia 9, 97–113. doi: 10.1016/0028-3932(71)90067-4
Oswald, F. O., McAbee, S. T., Redick, T. S., and Hambrick, D. Z. (2015). The
development of a short domain-general measure of working memory capacity.
Behav. Res. Methods 47, 1343–1355. doi: 10.3758/s13428-014-0543-2
Owen, A. M., McMillan, K. M., Laird, A. R., and Bullmore, E. (2005).
Nback working memory paradigm: a meta-analysis of normative functional
neuroimaging studies. Hum. Brain Mapp. 25, 46–59. doi: 10.1002/hbm.20131
Öztekin, I., McElree, B., Staresina, B. P., and Davachi, L. (2009). Working memory
retrieval: contributions of the left prefrontal cortex, the left posterior parietal
cortex, and the hippocampus. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 21, 581–593. doi: 10.1162/jocn.
2008.21016
Priori, A., Mameli, F., Cogiamanian, F., Marceglia, S., Tiriticco, M., Mrakic-Sposta,
S., et al. (2008). Lie-specific involvement of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in
deception. Cereb. Cortex 18, 451–455. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhm088
Real Academia Española (n.d.). Corpus De Referencia Del Español Actual (CREA).
[Reference Corpus Of Current Spanish (RCCS)]. Available online at: http://
corpus.rae.es/creanet.html (accessed October 1, 2017).
Rodrigues de Almeida, L., Pope, P. A., and Hansen, P. C. (2019). Task load
modulates tDCS effects on language performance. J. Neurosci. Res. 97, 1430–
1454. doi: 10.1002/jnr.24490
Romero Lauro, L. J., Rosanova, M., Mattavelli, G., Convento, S., Pisoni, A., Opitz,
A., et al. (2014). tDCS increases cortical excitability: direct evidence from
TMS-EEG. Cortex 58, 99–111. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2014.05.003
Russell, M., Goodman, T., Wang, Q., Groshong, B., and Lyeth, B. G. (2014). Gender
differences in current received during transcranial electrical stimulation. Front.
Psychiatry 5:104. doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2014.00104
Silas, J., and Brandt, K. R. (2016). Frontal transcranial direct current stimulation
(tDCS) abolishes list-method directed forgetting. Neurosci. Lett. 616, 166–169.
doi: 10.1016/j.neulet.2016.01.035
Silvanto, J., Muggleton, N., and Walsh, V. (2008). State-dependency in brain
stimulation studies of perception and cognition. Trends Cogn. Sci. 12, 447–454.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.09.004
Spence, S., Hunter, M. D., Farrow, T. F. D., Green, R. D., Leung, D. H., Hughes,
C. J., et al. (2004). A cognitive neurobiological account of deception: evidence
from functional neuroimaging. Philos. Trans. Biol. Sci. 359, 1755–1762. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2004.1555
Sporer, S. L. (2016). Deception and cognitive load: expanding our horizon with a
working memory model. Front. Psychol. 7:420. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00420
Sporer, S. L., and Schwandt, B. (2006). Paraverbal indicators of deception: a meta-
analytic synthesis. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 20, 421–446. doi: 10.1002/acp.1190
Sporer, S. L., and Schwandt, B. (2007). Moderators of nonverbal indicators of
deception: a meta-analytic synthesis. Psychol. Public Policy Law 13, 1–34. doi:
10.1037/1076-8971.13.1.1
Suchotzki, K., Verschuere, B., Van Bockstaele, B., Ben-Shakhar, G., and Crombez,
G. (2017). Lying takes time: a meta-analysis on reaction time measures of
deception. Psychol. Bull. 143, 428–453. doi: 10.1037/bul0000087
Tukey, J. W. (1977). Exploratory Data Analysis. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Turner, M. L., and Engle, R. W. (1989). Is working memory capacity task
dependent? J. Mem. Lang. 28, 127–154. doi: 10.1016/0749-596X(89)90040-5
Valle, T., Bajo, M. T., and Gómez-Ariza, C. J. (2020). Cathodal transcranial direct
current stimulation over the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex cancels out the
cost of selective retrieval on subsequent analogical reasoning. Neuropsychologia
141:107431. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2020.107431
Veltman, D. J., Rombouts, S. A. R. B., and Dolan, R. J. (2003). Maintenance versus
manipulation in verbal working memory revisited: an fMRI study. Neuroimage
18, 247–256. doi: 10.1016/S1053-8119(02)00049-6
Verschuere, B., Köbis, N. C., Bereby-Meyer, Y., Rand, D., and Shalvi, S. (2018).
Taxing the brain to uncover lying? Meta-analyzing the effect of imposing
cognitive load on the reaction-time costs of lying. J. Appl. Res. Mem. Cogn. 7,
462–469. doi: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2018.04.005
Verschuere, B., Schuhmann, T., and Sack, A. T. (2012). Does the inferior frontal
sulcus play a functional role in deception? A neuronavigated theta-burst
transcranial magnetic stimulation study. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 6:284. doi: 10.
3389/fnhum.2012.00284
Vrij, A., Fisher, R., and Blank, H. (2017). A cognitive approach to lie
detection: a meta-analysis. Legal Criminol. Psychol. 22, 1–21. doi: 10.1111/lcrp.
12088
Vrij, A., Fisher, R., Blank, H., Leal, S., and Mann, S. (2016). “A cognitive approach
to elicit verbal and nonverbal cues to deceit,” in Cheating, Corruption, And
Concealment, eds J. W. van Prooijen and P. A. M. van Lange (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), 284–310.
Vrij, A., Fisher, R., Mann, S., and Leal, S. (2008a). A cognitive load approach to lie
detection. J. Invest. Psychol. Offend. Profil. 5, 39–43. doi: 10.1002/jip.82
Vrij, A., Granhag, P. A., and Porter, S. (2010). Pitfalls and opportunities in
nonverbal and verbal lie detection. Psychol. Sci. Public Interest 11, 89–121.
doi: 10.1177/1529100610390861
Vrij, A., Mann, S., Fisher, R., Leal, S., Milne, B., and Bull, R. (2008b). Increasing
cognitive load to facilitate lie detection: the benefit of recalling an event
in reverse order. Law Hum. Behav. 32, 253–265. doi: 10.1007/s10979-007-
9103-y
Walczyk, J. J., Harris, L. L., Duck, T. K., and Mulay, D. (2014). A social-cognitive
framework for understanding serious lies: Activation-Decision-Construction-
Action Theory. New Ideas Psychol. 34, 22–36. doi: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2014.
03.001
Zuckerman, M., DePaulo, B. M., and Rosenthal, R. (1981). “Verbal and nonverbal
communication of deception,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,
Vol. 14, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York, NY: Academic Press), 1–59.
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2020 Sánchez, Masip and Gómez-Ariza. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No
use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 14 May 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 776
